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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plailntiff and Appellant,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
and FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,
Defendants,a;nd Respondents.

Case
No. 9625

APPELLANT'S REP'LY BRIEF
Plaintiff and appellant, National Farmers Union
Property and Casualty Company, submi,ts herewith its
brief in reply to defendant and respondents contention
as set forth in Point I of Respondent's Brief as follows :
The automobile driven by John H. Morgan, Jr. was
being used in the autmnobile business and, ~therefore,
was not covered by the defendant's policy.
The nature of the case and the disposition thereof
in the lower court are set out in borth appellant's and
respondent's briefs.
1
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RELIEF SOUGIIT
Plaintiff and appellant seeks to have the Supreme
Court.:
A. Strike Point I of Respondent's Brief and the
argument relating thereto, or
B. Sustain the finding and conclusion of the
Trial Court on the question dealt with in Point I of
Respondent's Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are adequately set forth both in Appellant's Brief and Respondent's Brief on the question
covered by this Reply Brief.
ARGUl\1:ENT
POINT I
THE CONTENTION EXPRESSED BY DEFENDANT
AND RESPONDENT, FARMERS INSURANCE EX·CHANGE,
IN POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF THAT THE AUTO·
MOBILE DRIVEN BY JOHN H. MORGAN, JR., WAS BEING
USED IN THE AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS AND, THEREFORE, WAS NOT COVERED BY THE DEFENDANT'S
POLICY IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT ON APPEAL AND
THEREFORE, NOT PROPERLY PART OF RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF.

The facts relating to the use of the loaned automobile
and the accident which subsequently occurred were submitted to the trial court upon stipulation between counsel
for plaintiff and defendant ( Tr. 1, :2) and upon hearing
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the facts and argtillll'nt the trial court held. that the
loaned auton10bile was not being used in the automobile
business at the tiine of the accident (Tr. 8, 9).
Paragraph 1 of the Conclusions of Law (part of the
record in this matter) reflects this finding by the Court.
Inasmuch as it was found as a 1natter of fact and
concluded as a matter of law by the trial court that the
use of the automobile by Mr. Morgan was not a use in
the automobile business and this finding and conclusion
was in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, plaintiff
made no appeal fron1 that part of the judg~nent. Appellant's appeal was taken from the judgment entered in
favor of defendant and against plaintiff and upon all
ques·tions of law and fact upon the whole record in this
cause as it relates to that judgment.
It is not the desire of appellant to have matters
reviewed on appeal ~that have been resolved in its favor
at trial. Nor was the matter of use of the automobile
in the automobile business dealt with in appellant's brief.
Notwithstanding, respondent did not prosecute a
cross-appeal to have this matter reviewed on appeal as
it was entitled to do and as provided for in Rules 75 (d)
and 74 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; nor does
respondent seek to have the mrutter of use of the automobile reviewed on appeal for any justifiable reason
since the trial court concluded as a matter of law that
the automobile was not being so used when the aceident
occurred (R. 41) and respondent seeks to have the judg3
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ment of the trial court sustained. See Re-spondent's
Brief, page 3.
Appellant, therefore, respectfully submits that Point
I of Respondent's Brief and the argument relating
thereto are not before this Court for purposes of review
and therefore cannot and should not he considered by
this Court.
POINT II
- THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVEN BY JOHN H. MORGAN,
JR. WA:S NOT BEING USED IN THE AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS AND, THEREFORE, WAS COVERED BY DEFENI)ANT'S POLICY.

In discussing the use of automobiles in the automobile business under Point II of this brief, appellant
incorporates its argument as set forth under Point I
of this reply brief and herewith proceeds to present
argument ·relating to this matter without prejudice to
its position as stated therein.
The policy. issued by defendant, Farmers Insurance
Exchange, to Raymond Earl Thomas, its insured, contains the following provisions :
"Additional definitions under Part I.
( 4) Automobile Business. Automobile business
me·ans the business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles, their parts or equipment."
Under the heading of Exclusions Under Part I the
policy provides :
4
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''This policy does not apply under Part I :
6. vVhile the <lescribed automobile is being used in
the automobile business, but this exclusion does not
apply to the nruned insured or his relatives."
John I-I. 1\forgan, Jr. was not ihe named insured
under the policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange
to Mr. Thomas, nor was he a relative of n1r. rl"homas,
the named insured. What this means under the provisions of the policy set forth above is that if nfr. Thomas
or any of his relatives use the insured vehicle in the
bu~inesf$ of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles, their parts or equipment, coverage
would still be afforded under the policy. However, if
Mr. Morgan used the insured automobile for any of
the above reasons then the exclusion indicated would
be applicable.
It is not enough to say that the insured automobile
was being used in the automobile business at the time
of the .accident and therefore no coverage afforded in
this instance, but it must be shown that 1\fr. }\forgan
so used the insured car. From the facts as stipulated
to by the parties it is abundantly clear that nfr. Morgan
was not using 1\fr. Thon1as' car to sell other cars, nor
was he using it for the purpose of repairing, servicing,
storing or parking other automobiles, their parts or
equipment. l-Ie v,-as using the loaned automobile for his
own personal and private use, not connected with any
business transaction, i.e., he was using the automobile
he had borrowed to go to his home to enjoy the con5
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venience of riding rather ~than the inconvenience of walking. The Thomas oar was being so used whiJle Mr.
Morgan's car was bet'ng repaired.
Appellant therefore asserts that the coverage exclusion applicable when the insured automobile is being
used in the automobile business is not applicable in this
situation by reason of the terms of the defendant's policy
and by reason of the facts of the case.
The question of use of insured automobiles in the
automobile business has been dealt with by many jurisdictions. Although the exclusionary provision of the
policies scrutinized have been very similar the facts
regarding the use to which the insured automobile was
put have differed significantly.

Cherat vs. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company and Central Sur:ety and Insurance Company,
264 F. 2d 767 (lOth Cir., Okla., 1959), 71 A.L.R. 2d 859,
arose out of a declaratory judgment action in which
the two appellee insurance companies sought and obtained a declaratory judgment, declaring that they were
not required to defend a damage action under policies of
insurance which t'hey had issued which action arose out
of an automobile accident. U.S.F. & G. had issued its
policy to one Schultz on an Auburn make automobile
involved in the collision and Central Surety had issued
its policy to 1\ir. Carter, both policies being conventional
liability insurance policies. Schultz O"\V'Iled the 1932
Auburn automobile which he left with Carter for repairs.
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vVhile the car was being driven by Carter it was involved
in the accident in which Cherot was injured.
Carter and ~chultz both worked for the same purnp
company. Carter's hobby was that of being an autornobile
mechanic and was wo:ddng on Schultz's automobile for
the cost of parts, electricity used, and a small amount
for storage. Although there was no agreement as to
payment for labor, Schultz testified that he intended to
pay Carter for his labor even though no n1ention had
ever been made between ~them for any charge other than
the actual expenses.
The U.S.F. & G. policy provided that it should not
apply "to an owned automobile while used in the automobile business." The Central Surety and Insurance
Company policy excluded coverage on a "non-owned
automobile while used (1) in ~the automobile business
by the insured." Central's policy also contained this
provis~ion: "automobile business means the business of
selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking of automobiles."
In reversing the declaratory judgment in favor of
the insurance companies, the Circui~t Court said:
"vVe are dealing here with an exclusionary
clause. Such provisions are strictly construed.
These policies were prepared by the insurance
companies. In the absence of a clear showing
therein to the contrary, it must be assumed that
the word "automobile business" as used in the
exclusionary clause means business in the ordinary accepted sense - that is, an undertaking
engaged in with some regularity a1't1d for profit
and ifncmne/' (E1nphasis added.)

7
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In another case with a rather complicated fact situation, National Union Indemnity Company issued its
garage liability policy to All Shalloek, Inc. and Shallock
Transportation, Inc. American Employers Insurance
Company issued its automobile liability policy to Shalloek Transportation, Inc., describing a particular automobile. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company issued its
automobile liability policy to Sealright, covering an
automobile ordinarily driven by one Morrissey, who was
an employee of Sealright, and also covering temporary
substitute automobiles. The American Employees policy
provided that the occupation of the named insured was
''contract fleet leasing" and that the purposes for which
the automobile was to he used were "pleasure and business." Shallock Transportation, Inc. had authorized Al
Shallock, Inc., which operated a garage, to lend the
Shallock Transportation, Inc. automobile insured by the
American Employees to customers.
l\Iorrissey ordinarily drove a car provided him by
Sealright, but had left it at Al Shallock, Inc. garage for
repairs, borrowing from Al Shallock, Inc. the automobile
owned by Shallock Transportation, Inc., and insured
by American Employees. \Vhile operating this automobile Morrissey collided with Lubow.
Lubow brought an action for damages against Morrissey, Al Shallock, Inc., National Union, Shallock Transportation, Inc., Ameriean E1nployees and Liberty Mutual.
As part of the legal maneuvering that went on in the
action Shallock Transportation, Inc. and American Employers moved for summary judg1nent dismissing the
8
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contplaint and cro8s-cOinplaint on the ground that the
garage exception on the mnnibus clause excluded coverage and on the further ground that the purpose of use
of the automobile was lilnited to pleasure and business.
On appeal the Suprerne Court o_f Wisconsin reversed
that part of the judgn1ent dismissing American Employers holding (a) that the garage exception did not apply
because it requires both that the person operating the
automobile be an agent or an employee of the garage
and that the accident arise out of the operation of the
garage, whereas Morrissey was neither the operator nor
the agent of the operator of a garage, (b) that the purposes of use declaration did not deny coverage for Mor~
rissey since he was using the automobile for the purposes
of his own business, which was neither that of Shallock
Transportation, Inc., nor of a garage, since where the
vehicle is insured for pleasure and business, that provision referred to the business or pleasure of any person
using the autonwbile, whether the named insured or not.
Lubow vs. illortTissey, 108 N.vV. 2d 156 (Wis. 1961).
From exarnination of the Cherot and 11orrissey cases
and considering them as they apply to the case on appeal
herein, it is obvious that l\1r. l\forgan was not using the
automobile owned by l\1r. Thomas and insured by defendant and respondent in an undertaking that he engaged in with some regularity for profit and incorne,
but for his O'\Vn transportation to his horne. Nor was
the automobile put to any use for Bountiful Motor Company by 1\Ir. 1\forgan. That 11r. 1\forgan's car was being
repaired while the Thomas automobile was being used
9
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is, appellant contends, completely irrelevant to the question being considered.
Other cases dealing with this problem are as follows :

Stephmnelli vs. Yuhas, 135 Pa. Super. 573, 7 A. 2d
124 ( 1939). The insurer issued a policy to Jean Walsh
covering her automobile. The omnibus clause of the
policy provided: ''Except that the terms and conditions
of this policy shall not be available to a public automobile
garage, automobile repair shop, automobile sales agency,
automobile service station and the agents and employees
thereof." Charles Walsh, husband of the named insured,
conducted an automobile repair shop.
Yuhas was employed as a truck driver by a leather
company. The truck broke down and Yuhas took it to
the repair shop for service. A required tie bolt was
not in stock and it was necessary to obtain it in Scranton,
a town some distance away. Yuhas stated that he had
to go to Scranton for his pay check. Walsh gave Yuhas
permission to operate the automobile of .Jean Walsh to
Scranton to ,obtain the tie bolt and the pay check. Yuhas
was being paid by the leather company for his time.
While Yuhas was on the way to Scranton an accident occurred in which Stephanelli was injured. In an
action by the injured person against Yuhas, judgment
was recovered against Yuhas. The insurance carrier
contended that defendant was an en1ployee of Walsh
and as such the car was being used in the automobile
business and hence the exclusion applicable.

10
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The trial Court found that Yuhas was not an employee of Charles Walsh and entered judgment against
the insurer, who appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the evidence warranted a finding that Yuhas
was an insured under the policy.
Employers Mt~;tual Casualty Company of Des Moines,
Iowa vs. F.ederate.d 111utual Implement and Hardware
Insurance Company, 213 F. 2d 421 (8th Cir., N~D. 1954).
Federated issued a garage liability policy to Ulvick's, a
corporation engaged at Aneta, North Dakota, in the sale
of farm implements and Chevrolet automobiles. The
policy covered the corporation and its officers for the
use of any automobile "in connection with" the eorporation's operations, the use in connection with the
corporation's operations of any automobile not owned
or hired by the corporation, and the use for "non-business purposes of any automobile * * * in charge of the
named insured and used principally in the garage business.''
Employers l\1utual issued its automobile policy to
Lusty covering a 1947 Chevrolet owned by him. Lusty
was an employee of the corporation. His car was not
used principally in the corporation's business and had
never been used by Mr. Ulvick, president of the corporation.
Mr. Ulvick's
of North Dakota
with her father's
sonal use a 1951

daughter, who attended the University
at Grand Forks, 65 miles from Aneta,
permission, took with her for her perChevrolet demonstrator owned by the
11
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corporation. She rendered no service for the corporation
either at home or at Grand Forks. The daughter was
instructed by her father to call him if the demonstrator
gave her any trouble. On December 22, 1951, when the
daughter undertoo:k to use the demonstrator to drive
home for the Christmas Holidays, it failed to start.
She called her father pursuant _to his instructions and
was told that he would drive to Grand Forks to fix the
demonstrator.
Because a corporation owned pickup truck was unusable, Lusty offered his 1947. Chevrolet automobile to
Mr. Ulvick. The latter accepted Lusty's offer and placed
in the car the necessary equip1nent for repairing the
dmnonstrator. He intended to fix the demonstrator, have
his daughter drive it to Aneta, and, if he had tune to do
so, look at some equipment for sale at East Grand
Forks for possible purchase by the corporation, before
he returned to Aneta. l-Ie would not have made the proposed trip to East Grand Forks except for his daughter's
call.
While Mr. Ulvick was driving Lusty's car on the
way to Grand For.ks an accident occurred in which several people were injured. The injured sued Mr. Ulvick
for damages.
Federated 1\futual, the garage corporation and :Mr.
Ulvick brought an action in the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota seeking a declaratory jud,gment against the Employers nfutual. The
District Court found as a fact that ~[r. Flvirk's :mission

12
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was a personal one not involving or incidental to the
corporation's business and held that Employers Mutual
policy covered him and that Federated's did not. Employers Mutual appealed.
The Court of Appeals affinned holding (1) that
if the demonstrator was not being used by the daughter
in the garage business the use of Lusty's car to go to its
aid would not be use in the operation of the corporation's
business, (2) that since Lusty's car was not used principally in the garage business, it was not covered under
the garage policy for non-business use, (3) that the
District Court was justified in concluding that the contingent possibility of an inspection of garage equipment
at East Grand Forks was not even an incidental reason
for the trip, (4) that the garage exception in the omnibus
clause of the Employer's Mutual policy on Lusty's car
therefore did not exclude coverage for Ulvick.

Commercial Sta;ndard Insurance Company vs. Sanders, 326 S.W. 2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App., 1959). The insurer
issued to Sanders its 1956 standard family automobile
policy affording collision coverage. Said policy provided
that it did not apply "to a loss to a non-owned automobile
arising ·out of its use by the insured in the automobile
business." The policy covered Sander's automobile.
Sanders was employed as a car salesman for an
automobile dealer in -Houston. He had formerly been
mnployed in :Madisonville and had left his family there.
During the week he lived in Ilouston but had arranged
with his employer's sales manager to drive its demon13
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strator from Houston to his home in l\'ladisonville for
the wee:kend. Upon arrival at ~iadisonville Sanders left
his employer's car at his home and used his personal car.
He made no effort to sell cars while he was there. On
Sunday, Sanders called the sales manager from 1\!adisonville, requesting permission to remain away from work
Monday to effect a personal trade of his house in Madisonville for one in Houston.
On Monday, he and the man involved in the real
estate negotiation left Madisonville in separate cars to
look at the Houston property. While Sanders was making
this trip in the employer's car a collision occurred.
This &ction was brought to construe the insurance
policy. Sanders testified that he was ''going to bring
the car back" to his employer after the trip in question.
The T'rial Court found that the automobile was not
being used by Sanders in the automobile business at the
time of the collision. The insurer appealed from an
adverse judgment.
The Court of Civil Appeal affinned, holding that
the ·Trial Court had correctly concluded that Sanders
was not using the automobile in the automobile business
at the time of the collision.
Other cases dealing with this question are Chavers
vs. St. Paul F~re and Mari·ne Insurance Company, 188
:U'. Supp. 39 (U.S.D.C. Ohio, 1960), holding that the
operation of a parking lot for patrons by a restaurant
where an attendant parked cars with the permission of

14
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the patrons was not a use of the particular car in the ·
automobile business.
Pilvero vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 12 App.
Div. 2d 130, 209· N.Y.S. 2d 90 (1960), affirming 22 Misc.
2d -!15, 195 N.Y.S. 2d 89 (1959), also to the effect that
an attendant parking cars of patrons. of a bakery and
restaurant for a fee with lknowledge and consent of the
owners of the business was not a use of automobiles
in the automobile business.
West Michigan Do-ck & Market Corpo·ration vs. St.
Paul- Mercury Indemnity Company, 82 F. Supp. 403
(U.S.D.C., Mich., 1949) affirmed without opinion 179
F. 2d 242 (6th Cir.) holding that where an employee
of a dock company who drove· the insured automobile
onto a ramp with the consent of the owner preparatory
to its being loaded onto a steamship and where the
automobile rolled down the ramp killing a certain person,
was not a use of the vehicle in the automobile business
nor was the dock company operating a public parking
place despite the fact that it occasionally permitted
groups using the boats to park their cars on a lot outside the enclosed area owned by the company.
J.lfcCree vs. Jenning, 155 Wash. 798, 349 P. 2d 1071,
where Jenning delivered his automobile for repairs to
Richard Miller, an automobile mechanic. After the repairs were completed, Jenning requested that Miller
deliver the automobile back to him. The car needed
gasoline before it could be returned to its owner. Frall!k
Farrell, a friend who was visiting Miller took the auto-
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mobile to have it filled with gasoline and on the way
to the service station was invo~ved in a collision with
McCree.
McCree filed suit against Jenning, Farrell and Miller
and recovered judgment against all three parties and
instituted garnishment proceedings against Farrell's liability insurance carrier.
It was contended that the automobile was being used
in the automobile business and that insurance coverage
was excluded. However, both the trial court and the
Supreme Court held that Farrell was merely accommodating a friend, who in turn was accommodating a
customer and that the vehicle was not being used in
the automobile business. The court stated that:

"* * * an automobile 'used in the automobile
business,' would be one which was employed for
some purpose in connection with that business.
For example, a tow truck, an automobile used
for demonstration purposes, or a vehicle used
for securing or delivering equipment and supplies
would be 'used in the· business.' "
LeFelt vs. Nasarow, 177 A. 2d 315 (N.J. Super.)
holding that a customer's automobile in the custody or
possession of an automobile repairman who drives it
for the purpose of testing the repairs which he has made
is not being used in the automobile business within the
meaning of an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy.
For other cases and annotations treating this and
allied subjects see 47 A.L.R. 2d 556-557 and 71 A.L.R.
2d 9·64.
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The case of Canadian Indernnity Company vs. National Insurance Company, 134 Cal. .App. 2d 512, 286
P. 2d 532 ( 1955) is distinguishable on its facts from the
case on appeal herein. In that case the owner of an
automobile repair shop and service station borrowed
his employee's car to go for some parts that were needed
in repairing another vehicle. Before leaving on the
errand the owner of the repair shop learned that a
friend, a parts salesman who often made the deliveries
was ill. The salesman's hmne and the establishment
where the parts were loooted were in the same general
direction and while the owner of the repair shop was
on his way to see the ill salesman, before going to pick
up the parts, an accident occurred.
The liability insurance policy of the employee of
the repair shop owner excluded from coverage any person or organization, or agent or employee thereof, operating an automobile repair shop, etc., "with respect to
any accident arising out of the operation thereof," and
it was held that such exclusion applied to the situation
presented therehy relieving the insurance company from
liability.
In the Canadian Indemnity case the owner of the
repair shop was using the insured automobile wfhile
engaged in repairing other automobiles and, in fact,
was using the insured vehicle to pick up the parts with
which to carry on his business. It should be noted also,
that the original and primary purpose of the trip was
to pick up automobile parts, the visit to the salesn1an
that was ill being only incidental. Not by any stretch
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:>f the facts or the imagination of respondent in this
matter can the situation presented in the Canadian Indemnity case be made to square with the situation presented in the case on appeal herein.
CONCLUSION
Appellant urges that the question of whether the
automobile used by J\:Ir. Morgan was being used in the
automobile business is not reviewable by this Court
in this appeal and should therefore be stricken from
respondent's brief. However, without pre·judiee to that
position appellant contends that the Thomas automobile
was not being used in the automobile business at the
time of the accident.
If it is contended by respondent that the vehicle
was being used in the automobile business at the time
of the accident to what business use was it being put
and hy whom~
Certainly, under the definition of automobile business in respondent's policy no such use was being made
of the car, for Mr. ~1organ was not even in "the business
of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles, their parts or equipment" and was not using
the automobile he borrowed from Mr. Thon1as for that
purpose. No such use of the automobile was being made
of the Thomas car as automobile business is described
in McCree vs. Jenning, for Mr. Morgan was not using
the car as a demonstrator or for securing or delivering
equipment and supplies. Respondent asserts in its brief
that the Thomas aut01nobile was being used in the same
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manner that a demonstrator or other vehicle may he
used. If so, by wh01n 1 Not by appellant's insured, John
H. Morgan, Jr., for he was not attempting to demonstrate
the advantages of this particular car to anyone. There
is no evidence that he even desired to purchase a new
car. All that Mr. Morgan desired was that his car be
repaired as quickly, efficiently and economically as possible so that he might not experience the inconvenience
of being without his own car.
If Raymond Earl Thomas was using the insured
automobile as a demonstrator so that he might obtain
a sale to Mr. Morgan in the future, and if this use of the
car was in the autom·obile business, then the exclusionary
provision in respondent's policy is inapplicable in this
situation because the automobile business ''exclusion
does not apply to the named insured or his relatives."
It cannot be said that Bountiful Motor Company
was using the Thomas automobile in the automobile
business because when Mr. ~forgan asked Kay Browning,
the service manager, for the use of a service vehicle
while his was being repaired he was advised that no
garage automobile was available. The customer, John
~Iorgn, Jr., was referred by the service manageT to
Dean Roberts, a car salesman, in an effort to obtain
the use of Roberts' personal car. Upon being advised
that l\Ir. Roberts' car was not available, Mr. Morgan
was then referred to Raymond Earl Thomas for the
use of Mr. Thomas' pe·rsonal car, which he obtained
with Thomas' pennission, not by authorization of the
service 1nanager of Bountiful ?\[otor Company.
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In view of the facts, authorities and argument presented, appellant concludes and therefore asserts that
this Court should strike Point I and the argument relating thereto in respondent's brief, or in the event the
Court should find the matter of use of the insured
automobile properly before it for purposes of review,
then the decision of the trial court on the matter of use
of the automobile should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, Esq.
.Attorney for Plaintiff
a;nd A ppellarnt
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